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INTRODUCTION
"[W]e can see no logical difference in kind between the invoca-
tion of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loy-
alty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation for
their lessons."' With these words, the Supreme Court either: (1) reaf-
firmed the value of religion as a constitutionally protected viewpoint
for moral instruction and character development, thus upholding the
Free Speech Clause; or (2) obscured the separation of church and
state by forcing the government to provide aid to an overtly religious
group, thus denigrating the Establishment Clause.2
Either of these competing interpretations of the Court's decision
in Good News Club v. Milford Central School could reasonably apply, de-
pending on the beholder's outlook on contemporary First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.3 For this reason, the Supreme Court's most
recent proclamation regarding viewpoint discrimination in Good News
Club provides a useful insight into the alleged "conflict between the
clauses. ' 4 Additionally, Good News Club is illustrative of a complicated
area of First Amendmentjurisprudence in a particularly salient scena-
rio because it involves two subjects that are very important to many
Americans: religion and education. 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Good News Club expressly to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether religious speech can be
I See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001) (Justice
Thomas writing for the 6-3 majority).
2 See id. at 144 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("[A]ddressing the Establishment Clause,
we can say this: there is a good case that Good News's exercises blur the line between
public classroom instruction and private religious indoctrination.").
3 This statement assumes that there is, and can be, a hierarchy within the First
Amendment. This assumption finds support in the Court's Good News Club decision-
as well as in earlier viewpoint discrimination cases. See id. at 113 ("[I]t is not clear
whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify
viewpoint discrimination."). For a discussion of commentators who have contested
the validity of assuming a conflict between the clauses within the First Amendment
see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
4 The limited scope of this Comment only permits a cursory discussion of the
alleged conflict between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. See discussion infra Part II. The phrase "conflict between the
clauses" is primarily used to describe the interrelation between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., 5 ROLAND D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 21.1 (3d ed.
1999); Symposium, The Freedom of Exressive Association, Religious Freedom and Institu-
tional Autonomy: Free Exercise, Establishment, and Expressive Association, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1885 (2001).
5 See infra Part I for a discussion of viewpoint discrimination.
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prohibited in a limited public forum. 6 In particular, the Eighth Cir-
cuit-in a case so similar that it even involved another Good News
club-held that the First Amendment mandated that permission be
granted to use the defendant school district's facilities. 7 In light of
the Second Circuit's polar opposite holding in Good News Club,8 the
Court clearly needed to attempt to clarify this difficult species of First
Amendment law-especially with one member from both the Second
and Eighth Circuit panels dissenting.9
The Supreme Court answered the preliminary question of which
circuit had correctly interpreted the Constitution and the relevant
precedents by reversing the Second Circuit's decision. 10 The Court
held that, given the school's community use policy, an adult-led Chris-
tian club was constitutionally entitled to use a New York public
school's facilities to teach elementary school children about the "good
news" of Jesus Christ.1 To understand the Court's ruling, determine
whether it successfully addressed the circuit split, and predict the im-
plications of the decision, one necessarily begins with the specific facts
of the case.
12
Milford Central School, pursuant to New York law, 13 adopted a
"Community Use Policy" in 1992, authorizing its building to be used
after school hours by residents of the school district. 14 Milford only
granted permission to use its building, however, if the community use
was directed toward what the school deemed permissible purposes,
6 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 105-06 (comparing Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuit decisions upholding the exclusion of religious speech with Eighth and Tenth
Circuit decisions striking down such restrictions).
7 Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1510 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the school's Amended Use Policy violated the Free Speech
Clause as impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
8 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the Club was permissibly excluded because its activities were not "pure moral
and character development" (internal quotations omitted)), rev'd, 533 U.S. at 98.
9 See Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1510 (Bright, J., dissenting); Good
News Club, 202 F.3d at 511 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
10 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120.
11 See id.
12 Where possible the following facts were taken from the Chief Judge McAvoy's
decision from the Northern District of New York. See Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), affd, 202 F.3d at 502, rev'd, 533 U.S.
at 98.
13 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (2002) (delineating uses for which school facilities
may be used and delegating to local school boards the authority to adopt reasonable
regulations for such uses).
14 See Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
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which were enumerated in the policy.1 5 Specifically, the district re-
sidents were permitted to use the building for: (1) "instruction in any
branch of education, learning or the arts," or (2) "social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining
to the welfare of the community; but such... uses shall be non-exclu-
sive and shall be open to the general public. 1 6 Although the school's
community-use policy essentially reiterated the relevant state guide-
lines, it also expressly prohibited the use of Milford's property for "re-
ligious purposes." 17 The specific provisions of the community-use
policy were implicated when Stephen and Darleen Fournier sought
permission to hold Club meetings in the school after hours.18
The Fourniers, who were residents of the school district, led a
non-denominational, Christian organization for children between the
ages of six and twelve whose stated purpose was to instruct children in
family values and morals "from a Christian perspective."' 9 When the
school stopped busing students to Club meetings (at the Milford
Center Community Bible Church where Mr. Fournier was pastor), the
Fourniers requested permission to use the school's facilities for Club
meetings immediately following the end of the school day.20 After
reviewing the Fourniers' request, Milford denied the Club access to
the school facilities. 2I Club meetings included prayer,22 Christian
songs,23 Bible verse memorization, 24 scripture readings, 25 and an em-
phasis on cultivating a personal relationship with Jesus Christ.26 Based
15 Id.
16 Id. at 149 n.2.
17 Id. at 150.
18 Id. at 149-50.
19 Id. at 154.
20 Id. at 149.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 157 ("Praying is also a regular part of each Club meeting. During
these prayers, the children may at times pray . . . to receive Jesus as their personal
Savior." (internal quotations omitted)).
23 See id. ("The children regularly sing songs of a religious nature that make refer-
ences to God orJesus Christ.").
24 See id. ("[T]he teacher emphasizes the importance of memorizing Biblical
verses by awarding the children prizes or candy for correctly reciting the assigned
verse.").
25 See id. ("The common theme emphasized in each lesson is the importance of
having a relationship with Christ." (internal quotations omitted)).
26 See id. (describing how several times throughout the lesson "challenges" and
"invitations" are issued). The "saved" children, "those who already believe in the Lord
Jesus as their Savior," are "challenged" to ask God for the strength to live morally. Id.
at 156. The "unsaved" children are "invited" to "trust in the Lord Jesus to be your
Savior from sin." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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on these characteristics, the superintendent concluded that the club
meetings were the "equivalent of religious worship," and consequently
the community-use policy precluded access to the Club. 27 The
Fourniers believed their rights had been violated and sought a judicial
remedy in the Northern District of New York.
28
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's Good News Club de-
cision and discusses its implications for future viewpoint discrimina-
tion cases, as well as for Free Speech and Establishment Clause cases
in general. Part I begins by tracking the Supreme Court's decisions in
the four most relevant viewpoint discrimination cases leading up to
Good News Club. In each of the four equal access cases the plaintiff
alleged viewpoint discrimination and the defendant asserted an en-
dorsement defense, as in Good News Club. Part I continues by discern-
ing a blueprint of the Supreme Court's inquiry in viewpoint
discrimination cases. Part II develops a snapshot of the jurispruden-
tial background for Good News Club by surveying the two sides of the
constitutional debate regarding whether the clauses of the First
Amendment are in conflict. Part III is the heart of this Comment,
analyzing in depth the Court's decision in Good News Club including
the procedural history, the majority holding and rationale, and each
of the separate opinions. Part IV provides the author's analysis of
Good News Club, discussing its implications for future viewpoint dis-
crimination cases as well as suggesting that the Court provided some
guidance affecting the conflict-between-the-clauses debate in general
and the test for endorsement more specifically.
I. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
A. Relevant Case Law
The First Amendment's prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion has been summarized by the Supreme Court recently as requiring
the "government [to] abstain from regulating speech when the spe-
cific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker
is the rationale for the restriction." 29 Cases involving allegations of
viewpoint discrimination and government endorsement of religion
27 Id. at 149 n.3 (stating in a letter from the superintendent that the reason for
the denial was that the Club's activities constituted "religious worship," which was
prohibited under school policy).
28 See id. at 150 (suing for injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees). See also
infra Part III.A for a discussion of the procedural history of the case.
29 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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usually require close factual analysis. 30 Although there is nothing un-
usual about questions of fact, such inquiries are complicated when the
related questions of law require the adjudicator to make several fine
distinctions.31 Four cases in particular lay the legal groundwork upon
which an understanding of the Court's viewpoint discrimination juris-
prudence. 32 In each of the following cases, reviewed in chronological
order, the Court considered a viewpoint discrimination claim under
the Free Speech Clause with an Establishment Clause defense.
1. Widmar v. Vincent
33
In 1977, the University of Missouri at Kansas City excluded a stu-
dent group named Cornerstone from use of its buildings for religious
worship and religious discussion.3 4 The University based the prohibi-
tion on one of its regulations denying use of college facilities "for pur-
poses of religious worship or religious teaching. '35 Students from the
group brought suit against the University seeking a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief, and the district court found the regulation
not only justified, but required by the Establishment Clause.36 On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit remanded, finding content-based discrimina-
30 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that government practices
relating to speech on religious topics must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny."
(internal quotations omitted)).
31 In three of the Court's recent religious viewpoint discrimination cases, careful
"fact-sifting" was necessary before deciding the question of law regarding content-
based exclusions of speech without a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 831 (finding that the university targeted student journals with religious
editorial viewpoints for disfavored treatment); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (holding that all religious viewpoints,
though treated equally, were impermissibly equally discriminated against); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1987) (determining that the exclusion of groups seek-
ing to engage in religious worship and discussion was content-based discrimination).
32 See sources cited supra notes 30-31.
33 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (8-1 decision).
34 Id. at 265.
35 Id.
36 Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 908, 918 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rem'd, 635 F.2d
1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (reasoning that "speech with religious
content cannot be treated the same as any other form of speech" because doing so
"would make a nullity of both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of
the first amendment").
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tion against religious speech without a compelling justification.3 7 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit.38
The Court began its analysis by finding that the University had
created an open forum for its student groups.39 After stating that First
Amendment rights of speech extend to college campuses, and that
religious worship and discussion are forms of protected speech, the
Court determined that the University's regulation was content-based
because the students were excluded due to the religious content of
their intended speech. 40 Justice White disagreed with the majority's
determination that religious worship is protected speech, reasoning
that religious worship should be distinguished from religious
speech. 41 The majority rejected this distinction as unintelligible, in-
administrable, and irrelevant. 42 Although the argument between the
Justices regarding how to characterize the religious activities at issue
was limited to one dissenting Justice here, the same dispute would
arise with greater force in Good News Club.
43
37 Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1320 (8th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that "[a]
neutral accommodation of the many student groups active at UMKC would not con-
stitute an establishment of religion even though some student groups may use the
University's facilities for religious worship or religious teaching").
38 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. Justice White as the sole dissenter found no First
Amendment violation on the facts in Widmar. Id. at 289 (White, J., dissenting). But
see Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (Justice White writing the unanimous decision).
39 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
40 Id. at 268-69.
41 Id. at 282 (White,J., dissenting) (stating that the argument that religious wor-
ship is protected speech "not different from any other variety of protected speech as a
matter of constitutional principle .... is plainly wrong").
42 Id. at 269 n.6. The Court stated that the distinction was unintelligible because
there was no meaningful standard available to determine when religious singing and
teaching because unprotected religious worship. Id. For the sake of argument, the
Court assumed that even if a meaningful standard was found, schools and the courts
would be required to monitor the speech in a way that would impermissibly entangle
the state with religion. Id. Lastly, the Court rejected the dissent's assumption relig-
ious speech aimed at winning converts was entitled to greater protection that relig-
ious speech by converts. Id.
43 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 138 (2001) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, with Ginsburg, J.,joining) ("It is beyond question that Good News intends
to use the public school premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a
particular, Christian point of view, but for an evangelical service of worship calling
children to commit themselves in an act of Christian conversion."). Compare Widmar,
454 U.S. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that the University
has not established a sufficient justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone
group to engage in religious worship on the campus."), with Good News Club, 533 U.S.
at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of classifying speech for
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After finding that the University had violated the Free Speech
Clause by denying access to Cornerstone, the Court considered the
University's argument that its exclusion of Cornerstone was justified
in the interest of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. 44 The
Court agreed with the University that "complying with its constitu-
tional obligations may be characterized as compelling," specifically re-
ferring to the University's duty to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation.45 Nevertheless, the Court immediately qualified this gen-
eral proposition by stating that the "equal access policy" at issue did
not run afoul of any of the three Lemon-test prongs. 46 In its reasoning
on the Establishment Clause issue, the Court emphasized both that
the open forum created by the University did not "confer any impri-
matur of state approval" on religion and that the forum was open to
over one hundred diverse student groups. 47 Thus, the Court's chief
concern regarding whether permitting the religious group to share
the open forum would have the primary effect of advancing religion
was resolved in favor of not finding a violation. 48
Lastly, in the interest of laying the groundwork for later portions
of this Comment, note that Widmar has been cited as authority sup-
porting the conclusion that a defendant's interest in avoiding an Es-
tablishment Clause violation can justify a Free Speech Clause
violation. 49 The Court's language in Widmar is ambiguous enough to
be used in good faith to support such a principle;50 however, the
Court has never held in accordance with this principle, and its validity
is a matter of dispute. 51
"religious purposes" into one of three different categories: discussion, worship, or
proselytizing).
44 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-71.
45 Id. at 271.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 274, 277.
48 Id. at 275.
49 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 281 (4th
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271).
50 The Court summarized its First Amendment conclusions by stating,
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special
constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scru-
tiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its
content. On the other hand, the state interest asserted here-in achieving
greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
51 See Part II for a discussion of legal scholars' denial of a supposed conflict be-
tween the clauses.
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2. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District52
The next viewpoint discrimination claim arose when a public
school in New York denied a local evangelical church access to its fa-
cilities to show a film series on family values from a Christian perspec-
tive. 53 When the church brought suit alleging First Amendment
violations, the district court granted summary judgment for the
school. 54 The district court characterized the school's facilities as a
limited public forum, stating that "once a limited public forum is
opened to a particular type of speech, selectively denying access to
other activities of the same genre is forbidden."55 Nevertheless, the
district court held that because the school district had not permitted
other groups akin to Lamb's Chapel-namely, those that were en-
gaged in religious worship or instruction-the school district's denial
of access was viewpoint neutral and constitutional. 5 6 In its reasoning,
the district court distinguished the Second Circuit's decision in Travis
v. Owego-Appaliachin School District.5 7 In Travis, the Second Circuit
held the Free Speech Clause required a religious fundraiser be per-
mitted access to school facilities on the ground that a religious Christ-
mas program involving collecting toys for needy children was
permitted in the past.58 Unlike in Travis, where the court found a
limited public forum for private fundraisers with religious themes, the
district court in Lamb's Chapel held that there was no limited public
forum for "organizations of similar character to Lamb's Chapel.
'5 9
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment "in all
respects."60 The circuit court began by stating that the question of
"[w]hether Center Moriches has opened its facilities to religious uses
and purposes presents a close question here."61 Lamb's Chapel tried
52 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (9-0 decision).
53 See id. at 388-89; see also id. at 388 n.3 (quoting the text of the brochure
describing the contents of the six parts of the film series).
54 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 927 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1991).
58 Id. at 692-93. The Second Circuit rejected the school district's argument that
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justified the viewpoint discrimination be-
cause "having an open-door policy that happens to allow religious speech does not
,endorse' or 'establish' a religion." Id. at 694 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
270-75 (1981)).
59 Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 99.
60 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389 (2d
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
61 Id. at 387.
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to show that the school district had a limited public forum permitting
access to school facilities for similar purposes by comparing their pro-
posed use to a Salvation Army Band Benefit Concert, a Gospel Music
Concert, and a lecture series entitled "Psychology and the Un-
known.''62 The court distinguished these past uses as only incidentally
religious. 6 3 The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Widmar and Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens.64  Widmar and Mergens involved students seeking to use
school property in a situation where many student groups had been
given access resulting in a "generally open forum. '6 5 Thus, the court
emphasized the location and the speaker in differentiating the prece-
dents. In particular, the fora were less restricted and the speakers
were students rather than outside individuals; therefore, the court de-
termined that the holdings were not controlling. Additionally, the
Second Circuit briefly noted that the holding in Mergens was based on
statutory grounds rather than constitutional grounds and that the Su-
preme Court had specifically refrained from deciding whether the
Free Speech Clause required the same result.6
6
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 67 finding the school
district's denial of access to the church "plainly invalid" under the
Free Speech Clause because an otherwise permissible film-a film dis-
cussing family values-would be permitted as having civic purposes,
yet such a film was denied simply because it was presented from a
religious perspective. 68 Furthermore, as in Widmar, the defendant
claimed that the state has an interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation, 'justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise
62 Id.; cf. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 93 n.5 (describing the lecture series the
Second Circuit simply referred to by lecture name as "on parapsychology and trans-
personal psychology and deal[ing] with eastern mysticism and metaphysics"); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392 (1993) (listing a total
of seventeen groups provided by Lamb's Chapel as evidence of a limited public forum
entitling them to access under the Free Speech Clause).
63 Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387-88.
64 Id. at 388; see Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
247 (1990) (holding that the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (b) (2000) prohibited
the high school from "discriminating, based on the content of the students' speech,
against students who wish to meet on school premises during noninstructional time").
65 Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 389 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267
(1981)).
66 Id.
67 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 385.
68 Id. at 393-94 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 807 (1985)).
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protected by the First Amendment."69 After applying Lemon, the
Court dismissed this argument, stating that the "posited fears of an
Establishment Clause violation are unfounded."70 In support of its
conclusion, the Court noted that the film would have been after
school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to the public.
71
Thus, the Court concluded that there was "no realistic danger" of the
community perceiving endorsement of religion.
72
3. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette
73
Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion in Capitol Square, one of
six Justices filing opinions.7 4 In the interest of brevity, this summary
will only highlight portions of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Capitol Square involved the denial of
the Ku Klux Klan's request to display a cross on Capitol Square, a
state-owned plaza next to the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio. 75 Al-
though various holiday displays were permitted, such as a Christmas
tree and a menorah, the KKK's formal application was denied.7 6 The
district court found in favor of the KKK's constitutional right to pub-
licly display a Latin cross, 77 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 78
Finding Capitol Square a public forum, the Court held that the
Advisory Board had failed to meet the strict-scrutiny test applicable to
content-based restrictions. 79 The defendants did not contest that they
had banned the display due to its content, but claimed they did so to
69 Id. at 394. The Court cited Widmar as having "suggested" that "the interest of
the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may be a compelling one justi-
fying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment." Id.
70 Id. at 395. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas were disturbed to a varying
degree by the application of Lemon to determine whether there was an Establishment
Clause violation. Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the application of
Lemon was "unsettling and unnecessary"); id. (Scalia, J., concurring, with Thomas, J.,
joining) (emphasizing that the Lemon test had been "repeatedly killed and buried").
71 Id. at 395.
72 Id.
73 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (7-2 decision).
74 Id. at 756. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor and
Justice Souter filed opinions concurring in part and in concurring in the judgment,
and Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.
75 Id. at 757-58.
76 Id. at 758-59.
77 Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (S.D.
Ohio 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994), affd, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
78 Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675, 676 (6th Cir.
1994), aff'd, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
79 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 515 U.S. at 770.
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avoid state endorsement of Christianity.8" Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion emphasized the Court's precedents in Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar and stated that the same factors that were determinative in
those cases were present in Capitol Square: (1) private speech not
sponsored by the state, (2) made on state property open to the public,
and (3) permission requested through the same process required of
other private groups.8 1 Only two Justices dissented, but three Justices
who concurred in the judgment declined to join Justice Scalia's enun-
ciation of the endorsement test.8 2 Justice Scalia applied a fixed test
regarding endorsement: "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Es-
tablishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open
to all on equal terms."8s3 Relying on dictionary definitions of the
word, Justice Scalia stated that "'[e] ndorsement' connotes an expres-
sion or demonstration of approval or support; '8 4 therefore, the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibition on government endorsement of religion
will only be triggered by "expression by the government itself, or else gov-
ernment action alleged to discriminate in favor of private religious ex-
pression or activity."8 5 Three other Justices agreed with this clear
statement of law, and Justice Scalia supported their interpretation
with two policy arguments justifying the rejection of a perception in-
quiry (such as Justice O'Connor's) under the endorsement test.
8 6
80 Id. at 761. Thus the presence of viewpoint discrimination was practically undis-
puted here, and the defendants relied entirely on the Establishment Clause as their
defense. Consequently, the Court spent little time discussing the elements of view-
point discrimination. Justice Scalia did, however, reaffirm the full protection of pri-
vate religious speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment: "in
Anglo-American history... government suppression of speech has so commonly been
directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would
be like Hamlet without the prince." Id. at 760.
81 Id. at 763.
82 See id. at 756. Justice Scalia announced the opinion of the Court, and he was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 757. Jus-
tices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer concurred in the judgment but rejected the plu-
rality's per se endorsement test. Id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring, with Souter &
Breyer,.1J., joining); id. at 783 (Souter, J., concurring, with O'Connor & Breyer, JJ.,
joining). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both filed their own dissenting opinions. Id.
at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 770. Justice Scalia quotes this same test in his concurring opinion in
Good News Club. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 121 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
84 Capitol Square Review & Advisoy Bd., 515 U.S. at 763.
85 Id. at 764 (citation omitted).
86 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia. Id. at 757.
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First, Justice Scalia stated that to apply the Establishment Clause to
private speech would put the First Amendment clauses in tension with
each other, and "[p]olicymakers would find themselves in a vise be-
tween the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses on the other. ' 87 Second, he reasoned that it
would be unrealistic to force judges or lawmakers to anticipate observ-
ers' misperceptions about endorsement, whether those mispercep-
tions are reasonable or not.8
8
Justice O'Connor explained her reason for parting company with
the plurality by stating that the "plurality today takes an exceedingly
narrow view of the Establishment Clause that is out of step both with
the Court's prior cases and with well-established notions of what the
Constitution requires."8 9 Justice O'Connor described the endorse-
ment inquiry as asking whether a "reasonable person"-who is the
"personification of a community ideal of behavior, determined by the
[collective] social judgment"-would perceive a particular action as
an endorsement of religion.90 Therefore, under Justice O'Connor's
"perception inquiry," a private party's actions or words violate the Es-
tablishment Clause if a reasonable person would perceive that private
speech as endorsed by the government. Despite their different inter-
pretations of the Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor and the two
87 Id. at 767-68. The subsequent litigation surrounding public school policies in
Rosenberger and Good News Club reveal the sagacity of this statement.
88 See id. at 768 n.3.
89 Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor disapproved of the
"fixed, per se rule" approach applied by justice Scalia and instead insisted that "every
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine
whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 778
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)). Justice O'Connor originally es-
poused this interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984), submitting that identification of government endorsement required in-
quiring into how individuals perceive the "objective" content of the message. See id. at
690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "[t]he effect prong asks whether, irre-
spective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval"); id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to deter-
mine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion."). Unlike
Capitol Square, the facts in Lynch involved a local government setting up a religious
display, rather than the government merely administering a neutral public forum. See
id. at 671; cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 774 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (dismissing this factual distinction as immaterial).
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Justices joining her opinion agreed with the plurality that there was
no government endorsement of religion.91
4. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia92
Rosenberger, the companion case of Capitol Square, returns our re-
view of viewpoint discrimination cases to religious speech at public
schools. 93 A student group called Wide Awake Productions (WAP) at
the University of Virginia brought the case.94 WAP published a stu-
dent periodical, Wide Awake, which its editors described as offering a
"Christian perspective on both personal and community issues."95 As
a college recognized "Contracted Independent Organization" in-
volved in publication of a student periodical, WAP believed it was enti-
tied according to guidelines at the University of Virginia to have its
printing costs reimbursed by the Student Activities Fund (SAF).96 Af-
ter publication, the University refused to reimburse the $5862 bill on
the ground that the periodical was "religious activity" and not entitled
to reimbursement under the university guidelines. 97 With no further
recourse within the University, WAP filed suit against the University in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking
damages for the printing costs, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
attorney's fees.98
The district court granted the University's summary judgment
motion, finding no viewpoint discrimination because the SAF was a
nonpublic forum and the university guidelines restricting access to
91 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 770 (plurality opinion); id.
at 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring, with Souter & Breyer, JJ., joining). Justice Stevens
called Justice O'Connor's conceptualization of the "reasonable person" an "enhanced
tort-law standard [that] is singularly out of place in the Establishment Clause con-
text." Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Stevens would find en-
dorsement where "some viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a
government endorsement." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (5-4 decision).
93 Id. at 822-23.
94 Id. at 825.
95 Id. at 826.
96 See id. at 827. University guidelines specified that one of the CIO activities
qualifying for funding was "student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups." Id. at 824.
97 Id. at 827. A "religious activity," was defined under the guidelines as any activ-
ity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie [f] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality." Id. at 825.
98 Id. at 827.
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the funds were reasonable. 99 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding
that the SAF guidelines engaged in viewpoint discrimination by for-
bidding funding for "religious activities."' 0 0 Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit found for the University because it held that the discrimina-
tion by the University was justified by the "compelling" interest in
"avoiding the creation of an 'establishment' of religion at the Univer-
sity of Virginia."' 0 1 The court applied the Lemon test reasoning that
although its precedential value had been repeatedly questioned,
10 2 it
was still the mandatory test.'0 3 The court held that the primary effect
of paying WAP's publication costs would be to advance religion and
would result in an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion. 10 4 The court also determined that the prohibition of SAF fund-
ing to all "religious activities" was narrowly tailored in light of the
difficulty of avoiding entanglement with religion by other means.
10 5
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. 10 6 The Court began
its analysis with the determination that the University had created a
limited public forum and it was constructed to impermissibly "select[ I
for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with relig-
ious editorial viewpoints."1 0 7 The Court then proceeded to rely on
Lamb's Chapel as the controlling precedent as evidence of viewpoint
discrimination.' 0 8 At one time, the Court's analysis regarding the Es-
tablishment Clause issue could have been complicated by the issue of
state funding; however, the presence of state funding had no effect on
99 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 181-82, 184
(W.D. Va. 1992), affd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
100 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 280-81 (4th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
101 Id. at 282 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
102 See id. at 282 n.30 (citing five Justices who have questioned the validity of the
-Lemon standards).
103 See id. ("For purposes of the Establishment Clause question presented here,
therefore, we are bound to consider Lemon governing precedent.").
104 See id. at 285. The court was particularly concerned about the third Lemon
prong, excessive government entanglement with religion, because direct monetary
subsidization was involved:
Because Wide Awake is a journal pervasively devoted to the discussion and
advancement of an avowedly Christian theological and personal philosophy,
for the University to subsidize its publication would, we believe, send an un-
mistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports Christian val-
ues and wishes to promote the wide promulgation of such values.
Id. at 286.
105 See id. at 287.
106 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995).
107 See id. at 829, 831.
108 See id. at 831-33.
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the Court's approach.t 9 Instead, the Court applied the neutrality
principle. 110 The Court emphasized the open forum for various stu-
dent groups, the equal access of those groups to funding, and efforts
of the University to disassociate itself from endorsement of the views
of any of the student run organizations." Therefore, the Court
found that because the neutrality principle had been satisfied, there
was no Establishment Clause violation.
112
On a related note, Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion with
an intriguing statement: "[t] here is no Establishment Clause violation
in the University's honoring its duties under the Free Speech
Clause."'1 3 This statement could be read as implying the Supreme
Court's disavowal of the conflict-between-the-clauses approach to the
interaction between the clauses in the First Amendment. 114 Such
speculation may not be worthy of conclusive generalization, but Jus-
tice Kennedy's statement is indicative of the emerging pattern within
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence characterized by a symbi-
otic relationship between the clauses rather than a parasitic one.'
1 5
For example, Rosenberger marked the fourth straight time that the
Court found for plaintiffs alleging viewpoint discrimination and re-
jected the government's argument that avoidance of an Establishment
Clause violation constituted an affirmative defense.' 16 More signifi-
cantly, Rosenberger repeated the Court's increasingly apparent ten-
dency to find a Free Speech Clause violation claim while denying the
parallel Establishment Clause defense.' 17 Thus, rather than encour-
aging the expansion of an Establishment Clause that grows at the ex-
pense of the Free Speech Clause, the Court has fostered a mutually
beneficial relationship between the two clauses as part of one Amend-
109 See id. at 837-38.
110 See id. at 839 ("A central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in
upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their
neutrality toward religion."). It is worth noting that the Court never mentioned the
Lemon test.
111 See id. at 840-42.
112 See id. at 845-46.
113 Id. at 846.
114 See discussion infra Part III.
115 The Supreme Court has yet to reveal the implications of this statement. Two
circuit court opinions, however, have quoted this language from Rosenberger to sup-
port their determination that the Establishment Clause had not been violated. See
KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1056 n.31 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63
F.3d 581, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ripple, J.).
116 See Part II.A.
117 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
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ment. Good News Club further establishes the strength of this constitu-
tional mandate. 118
For these reasons, Rosenberger is a fascinating introduction to the
Court's decision in Good News Club. The Rosenberger decision also fore-
shadowed the result in Good News Club because the Justices in Rosenber-
ger divided along nearly identical lines in Good News Club.119
Additionally, Rosenberger demonstrated the importance of characteriz-
ing the determinative facts because both the majority and dissent
spend a greater portion of their time examining the specific facts in
the case, similar to the Court's factual analysis in Good News Club.
120
With this case law as the backdrop, this Comment will now attempt to
summarize the Court's viewpoint discrimination inquiry.
B. Blueprint of the Court's Viewpoint Discrimination Inquiry
As a subcategory of free speech protection, the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination requires the court to make a series of
detailed inquiries that run the question-word gamut. Who is the
speaker, the government or a private individual? What is the speaker
saying, and is the speech protected? Where and when is the speech
uttered, namely, what is the forum? How and why was the restriction
imposed, for example, was the restriction content-based or content-
neutral?121 A brief elaboration of each of these inquiries as applied to
viewpoint discrimination follows with illustrations from Supreme
Court decisions where relevant.
1. Who Is the Speaker?
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of prevent-
ing viewpoint discrimination: "When the government targets not sub-
ject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimina-
tion."122 In determining viewpoint discrimination, the first step is to
118 See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
119 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined. Id. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).
120 See generally id. at 822-46 (analyzing facts that are similar to Good News Club); id.
at 863-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
121 This blueprint for judicial analysis of religious viewpoint cases is present to a
varying degree in each of the four cases discussed in Part II.A.
122 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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identify the speaker, the who. 123 The Free Speech Clause only applies
as a restraint on the government.1 24 Therefore, if the government
cannot be identified as restricting private speech, the case ends there.
Although the options for a speaker are limited to two, either the gov-
ernment or a private individual, the determination is complicated by
the need to consider the speaker under both the Free Speech Clause
and the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor framed the inquiry
by stating that the "crucial difference [is] between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and pri-
vate speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exer-
cise Clauses protect."'125 The problem is that the Court is divided on
how to identify government speech in the context of the Establish-
ment Clause. For example, in Capitol Square, a majority of the Court
interpreted the Establishment Clause prohibition on government en-
dorsement of religion as potentially reaching the actions or words of a
private party. 126 Consequently, a vast, largely uncharted gray area ex-
ists in the viewpoint discrimination context, making the courts' task of
identifying the type of speech very difficult, though there are a few
clearly defined landmarks to guide courts along their way. 127 This le-
gal wilderness is particularly precarious when the avowedly private
plaintiffs are engaged in religious speech of some variety while in a
government controlled forum. The difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween private speech and government endorsement, or the percep-
tion of such, is most likely the cause of-as well as the strongest
supporter in the maintenance of-the "clauses-in-conflict" argument
discussed in greater detail in Part III.
123 Though often not explicitly stated, the state-actor requirement must be pre-
sent in each viewpoint discrimination case because the First Amendment does not
restrain private actors.
124 See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent
Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 885-86 (2001) (stating that "the First Amend-
ment, indeed, each of the first eight Amendments, further limited the existing powers
enumerated of the national government while adding to its powers not at all," there-
fore, "the [First] Amendment is a check on government and government alone").
125 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
126 See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text for discussion of the split be-
tween fourJustices who interpreted the Establishment Clause as only applying to gov-
ernment speakers, three Justices who interpreted it as extending to private speech
that a reasonable person could perceive as receiving government endorsement, and
one Justice who interpreted it as further extending to private speech that some peo-
ple are likely to perceive as receiving government endorsement.
127 The Supreme Court cases cited in Part II.A demonstrate the difficult line-draw-
ing required in the viewpoint discrimination or endorsement inquiry.
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2. What Type of Speech, and Where Is the Speaker?
The second and third inquiries in the free speech analysis, a find-
ing of constitutionally protected speech and a determination of the
speaker's forum, are normally undisputed in viewpoint discrimination
cases. 128 The speech in viewpoint discrimination cases is often relig-
ious, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that religious
speech is entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amend-
ment.129 Similarly, though to a lesser extent, the forum at issue in
viewpoint discrimination cases-especially those involving schools-
tends not to be highly disputed. 30 The standards that the Court ap-
plies to determine whether the government has engaged in impermis-
sible viewpoint discrimination will depend on the type of forum.
131
Three types of speech fora exist:.public, limited or designated public,
and nonpublic. 32 In each, the government has a varying degree of
control over protected speech in those fora and has exercised it in
different ways: public fora must be made available for speech-for ex-
ample, sidewalks and parks; 33 limited-public fora may be opened to
128 The nature of the forum at issue was undisputed in each of the four cases
mentioned in Part ILA, as it was in Good News Club itself. See Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
129 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760
(1995) ("Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a
First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secu-
lar private expression."); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (holding that a film series on family and child-rearing issues
from a Christian perspective was protected under the Free Speech Clause); Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs., 496 U.S. at 250 (stating that private speech endorsing
religion is protected by the Free Speech Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
269 & n.6 (1981) (stating that religious worship is speech protected under the Free
Speech Clause); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
656 (1981) (stating that religious proselytizing is speech protected under the Free
Speech Clause).
130 In Good News Club itself, the parties stipulated that the school had created a
limited public forum, thus the Court assumed that it had. See Good News Club, 533
U.S. at 106; see also Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389 (following the district court's find-
ing of a limited public forum without further discussion).
131 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
132 See id. at 45-47 (summarizing three of the different types of speech fora); ROD-
NEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 145-48 (1999) (explaining the types of speech
in the "Multi-Tiered Structure of Public Forum Law"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Court
Takes a Narrow View of Viewpoint Discrimination, TRIAL, Mar. 1999, at 90, 90 (describing
the three types of speech fora).
133 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998). The
Court may still impose time, place, and manner restrictions on the speech because
such restrictions are content neutral. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316,
322-23 (2002).
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speech on specified subjects; 134 and nonpublic fora are areas that the
government has permissibly closed to public speech completely.135 It
is essential to note that "[o] nce it has opened a limited forum ... the
state must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set."' 136 As previ-
ously stated, when the government makes content-based restrictions
on speech in an open or limited public forum, the restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny and are invalid unless they are narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling state interest.1 37 Therefore, though the
classification of the forum at issue is often not disputed, it is an essen-
tial step that often provides a strong indication of how the Court will
resolve the case.
138
3. How Does the Restriction Apply to the Speech?
The fourth inquiry, the determination of whether the govern-
mental restriction on the speech in question was content-based or
content-neutral, cuts to the very heart of viewpoint discrimination. 
139
Viewpoint discrimination is, after all, an "egregious form of content
discrimination.' 1 40 The import of this is that all content discrimina-
tion, or "[d]iscrimination against speech because of its message[,] is
presumed to be unconstitutional." 141 Like the question of who is the
speaker, this inquiry is highly fact specific and often will be a close call
in viewpoint discrimination cases-particularly if the defendant al-
leges that the government is endorsing the religious speech in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause.
Now, with a greater familiarity with the Supreme Court's view-
point discrimination jurisprudence, an inquiry into the debate be-
134 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
135 See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981) (stating that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property sim-
ply because it is owned or controlled by the government").
136 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
137 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2534 (2002); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
138 Compare Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Capitol Square, where only one Justice in
all three cases found no viewpoint discrimination in the context of a generally open
public forum, with Rosenberger and Good News Club, where a total of eight Justices
found no viewpoint discrimination in the context of more restrictive limited public
fora.
139 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (ap-
plying the test for viewpoint discrimination as triggered by finding a content-based
exclusion).
140 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
141 Id. at 828.
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tween the commentators can be made. Throughout Part III,
remember that in all four of the Court's preeminent cases on view-
point discrimination, the parties pitted the two First Amendment
clauses against each other. Is the conflict between the Free Speech
Clause and the Establishment Clause inherent in the First Amend-
ment and thus unavoidable, or is the conflict a construct of litigious
parties seizing upon ambiguous, perhaps sloppy, language from the
Court's decisions in the interest of securing a favorable judgment?
II. FIRST AMENDMENT BATTLEGROUND: THE ALLEGED CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE CLAUSES
This Part begins by surveying the constitutional battlefield that is
regularly fought within the courts. The dispute over how to interpret
the Establishment Clause is just one battle in a much larger war; and,
like all significant battles, it has moral, social, political, and economic
facets that require consideration. 142 On one side is the camp that in-
terprets the Establishment Clause as extending beyond government
speech: "[p]rivate religious expression becomes constitutionally prob-
lematic whenever the expression creates a reasonable perception of a
linkage between the government and a particular set of sectarian prin-
ciples-even if the government endorsement of those principles is im-
plicit rather than explicit." 43 ' In other words, even when the speaker
engaged in religious speech is a private individual, the Establishment
Clause may still be implicated. 144 On the other side is the camp that
interprets the Establishment Clause as applying "only to the words and
acts of government. It was never meant, and has never been read by
this Court, to seive as an impediment to purely private religious
speech connected to the State only through its occurrence in a public
forum." 145 This generalization of the two sides to the Establishment
142 See Part IV for a discussion of the non-legal implications of the battle over the
interpretation of Establishment Clause and viewpoint discrimination in general.
143 Steven G. Gey, The No Religion Zone: Constitutional Limitations on Religious Associ-
ation in the Public Sphere, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2001); see, e.g., Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (holding that school policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violated the Establishment
Clause because "delivery of such a message-over the school's public address system,
by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty,
and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public
prayer-is not properly characterized as 'private' speech").
144 See supra notes 89-91 (discussing Justice O'Connor's "perception inquiry"
under the Establishment Clause to determine whether the private speaker's words or
actions constitute government speech endorsing religion).
145 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 767. Accordingly, this camp
interprets the majority's holding in Santa Fe Independent School District very differently.
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Clause debate provides the backdrop for the analysis of the alleged
conflict between the clauses in this Part. The battle lines on how to
identify government endorsement of religion are drawn when the
Court is faced with a viewpoint discrimination claim under the Free
Speech Clause. Both clauses are potentially implicated because the
particular views targeted by the government for disparate treatment
are, in fact, very often religious. 146 Thus, injecting religion into the
Court's intellectually challenging free speech jurisprudence immedi-
ately complicates the difficult task before a court, while probably guar-
anteeing that the case will be more controversial, thereby making a
carefully reasoned decision by the court that much more important.
Rather than dispelling the clauses-in-conflict argument as un-
founded or erroneous, the Court has given credence to it by stating
that "[t]here is no doubt that compliance with the Establishment
Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-
based restrictions.' 1 4 7 The Court based this balancing approach-
where the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses are weighed against
each other-on similar statements in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar1
4
1
Earlier in Mergens, the Court gave perhaps its clearest expression of a
supposed conflict between the clauses, stating that the "case involves
the intersection of two First Amendment guarantees-the Free
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause" 49 and "introduction of
religious speech into the public schools reveals the tension between
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The
Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district's student-mes-
sage program is invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even more
disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it bristles with hostility
to all things religious in public life.").
146 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832 (involving university denial of student
funds to student newspaper because its contents revealed an "avowed religious per-
spective"); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993) (involving school district's denial of church's request to use school facilities to
show a film on an otherwise permissible subject solely because of its religious view-
point); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981) (involving university's denial of
student group's request to use school facilities for "religious worship and religious
instruction").
147 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761-62.
148 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 ("[T]he interest of the State in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation may be a compelling one justifying an abridgement of
free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment." (internal quotation omit-
ted)); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (giving support to the "tension" between the clauses by
declaring that the "state interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution-is limited ... in this case by the Free Speech Clause").
149 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 263 (1990).
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these two constitutional commitments, because the failure of a school
to stand apart from religious speech can convey a message that the
school endorses rather than merely tolerates that speech. ' 150 The
Court has yet to find a violation of the Free Speech Clause and then
state that it was justified by the need to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation that would have otherwise occurred. Therefore, it is likely
that the Court has only given nominal recognition to such a balancing
approach. More encouragingly, the Court in Rosenberger shied away
from language supporting the purported tension between the
clauses. 151 Moreover, the Court took a step toward enunciating a
symbiotic relationship between the clauses by stating in its conclusion
that "[t]here is no Establishment Clause violation in the University's
honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause." 15 2 Though this
language is a step in the right direction, it is probably insufficient to
eliminate confusion in the courts.
In light of the above discussion, one possible explanation for the
competing interpretations of the Court's decision in Good News Club,
mentioned above-namely, whether it is commendable as expanding
free speech rights or contemptible as eviscerating Establishment
Clause rights-is that the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses are
in conflict with each other: expanding the Free Speech Clause means
contracting the Establishment Clause, and vice versa. Many of the
Court's viewpoint discrimination cases give credence to this embattled
conceptualization of the First Amendment, 153 including Good News
Club, though to a lesser extent.1 54 Nevertheless, this "clauses-in-con-
flict" nomenclature, however plausible, is logically inaccurate.
55
Professor Carl Esbeck, 156 the paradigmatic commentator seeking
to debunk the clauses-in-conflict nomenclature, argues that the Free
150 Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
151 See supra Part I.A.4.
152 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995).
153 See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the Court's First Amendment decisions in
Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, Capitol Square, and Rosenberg.
154 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the majority opinion in Good News Club.
155 Carl H. Esbeck and Richard W. Garnett, on behalf of the Christian Legal Soci-
ety, and Nathan J. Diament, on behalf of the Institute for Public Affairs Union of
OrthodoxJewish Congregations of America, also disputed the validity of the conflict
between the clauses in the amicus brief they submitted in support of Good News
Club. See Amicus Brief for Petitioners, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98 (2001) (No. 99-2036) (arguing that the Supreme Court should "reject any
invitation to use the Establishment Clause as a sword driving private religious expres-
sion from the marketplace of ideas").
156 Professor Esbeck is the Isabella Wade and Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia. See Esbeck, supra note 124, at 883 n.1.
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Speech and Establishment Clauses cannot be in conflict with each
other at all. 157 Professor Esbeck has written prolifically on the subject
of the "clash-of-the-clauses" in the First Amendment in a consistent
attempt to confront and clear up the confusing inaccuracies in the
Court's jurisprudence. 158 Esbeck calls the so-called conflict between
the clauses "completely nonsensical" and supports his argument by
summarizing the intricate interaction between the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses by saying, "If the speech is government speech
(including private speech that has the government's imprimatur) and
the content is inherently religious, then the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits the speech."' 5 9 Esbeck qualifies his statement with the paren-
thetical which notes that there are many difficult cases where the
presence of the "government's imprimatur" is the crux of the case.
The test for identifying private speech with the government's impri-
matur, therefore, is critical to determining the scope of the Establish-
ment Clause and ensuring a symbiotic relationship with the Free
Speech Clause. 160 Indeed, such is the case all too often in viewpoint
discrimination cases, Good News Club included. It is undeniable that
the First Amendment only applies to, and accordingly, only constrains
157 See id. at 887 ("Given that the Establishment Clause restrains government and
government alone, not private individuals, this 'clash-of-the-Clauses' argument is com-
pletely nonsensical."); Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid
Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
285, 301 (1999) (arguing that the Court should avoid arbitrarily favoring one First
Amendment'clause over another when confronted with an alleged conflict between
the clauses and instead "ought to conclude from this apparent tension ... that it has
miscued when interpreting one or both clauses") [hereinafter Esbeck, Myths, Miscues,
and Misconceptions]; Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
Government Power, 84 IowA L. REV. 1, 11 (1998) (" [C] ourts are increasingly confronted
with supposed 'collisions' of the Establishment Clause with other Clauses in the First
Amendment that force them to subordinate one Clause to give the other full play.
This makes no sense."); Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Government Cooperation
with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 45 n.134 (1997) ("[T]here is
nothing in the wording of the First Amendment that suggests that when clauses osten-
sibly 'conflict,' the Establishment Clause overrides the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses. One could just as easily presume that the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses supersede the Establishment Clause."); Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the
Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 581, 594-95 (1995) (stating that "a cardinal rule of construction is that the text-
of the First Amendment has to be assumed internally coherent" and suggesting that
the distinction between government speech and private speech determines whether
the Free Speech Clause or the Establishment Clause applies).
158 See sources cited supra note 157.
159 Esbeck, supra note 124, at 889 (footnote omitted).
160 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the test for endorsement and its
implications.
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the government on its face. Such governmental constraint, however,
has practical restrictions for private individuals, as applied.
Maximizing speech by private, religious groups by emphasizing
the Free Speech Clause does not necessarily mean subordinating the
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment hierarchy. On the con-
trary, the two clauses are part of the same constitutional amendment
for good reason-namely, both clauses seek to protect individual
thought. 161 More specifically, the Free Speech Clause prevents the
government from interfering with individual thought by restricting
private speech, and the Establishment Clause prevents the govern-
ment from interfering with individual thought by becoming a speaker
itself, rather than leaving Mill's "marketplace of ideas" 162 to private
individuals. Both clauses create negative rights for individuals. This
guarantee of "freedom from" is accomplished by targeting the govern-
ment, and the clauses restrict the government alone. Accordingly, the
two clauses technically cannot be in tension with each other; rather,
one is the natural corollary of the other. Each clause supports the
other in an attempt to accomplish a common goal: to limit the gov-
ernment, both in its control over private speech and in its influence
over religion. Nonetheless, the litigation on this matter indicates that
there currently is an undeniable tension between the clauses. The
Court's complicated, often indeterminate, viewpoint discrimination
jurisprudence is a particularly vivid example of this reality. Part III
focuses on the Court's most recent viewpoint discrimination case, the
nexus of this Comment.
III. GOOD NEws CLuB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
1 6 3
A. Procedural History
Following Milford's denial of the Club's request to hold meetings
after hours on school property, the Club, along with Ms. Fournier and
her daughter Andrea, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Milford, alleging, inter alia, that free speech rights under the First
Amendment had been violated. 164 Subsequently, the Club moved for,
161 See Viewpoint Discrimination-Funding for Religious Publication, 109 HARv. L. REV.
210, 219 (1995) ("The two clauses are not foes, but rather jointly represent the idea
that an individual's religious freedom should be protected from governmental
interference.").
162 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., AHM Publ'g Corp. 1947)
(1859).
163 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (6-3 decision).
164 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (N.D.N.Y.
1998), affd, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). The Fourniers'
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and was granted, a preliminary injunction to prevent the school from
excluding the Club.165 The district court later vacated the preliminary
injunction and granted the school's motion for summary judgment.
166
The court based its holding on the finding that the Club's primary
emphasis was "religious subject matter" rather than "merely a religious
perspective on a secular subject.' 67 Noting that Milford had not al-
lowed other groups providing religious instruction to use its facilities,
the court reasoned that the school could constitutionally deny access
to the Club because the prohibition was "based on the general subject
matter-religious instruction and prayer, and not on a particular per-
spective or viewpoint on a subject otherwise within the forum's limita-
tions." 168 Therefore, the court concluded that the school district had
not engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.' 69
On appeal, Judge Miner, writing for the Second Circuit, affirmed
the district court's decision by holding that Milford had not engaged
in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 170 After agreeing that
Milford had created a limited public forum, the appellate court ap-
plied a two-part test for impermissible viewpoint discrimination:
"[r] estrictions on speech in a limited public forum will withstand First
Amendment challenge if they are reasonable and viewpoint neu-
tral."'171 Like the Northern District of New York District Court, the
Second Circuit focused on the Club's emphasis on a personal relation-
ship with Jesus Christ as the foundation for living a moral life as being
"quintessentially religious."' 72 In support of this conclusion, the court
relied heavily on its ruling in Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Community School
complaint also included a § 1983 claim for equal protection rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment and a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 161.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id. (mentioning that because the plaintiff's free speech rights had not been
violated, there was no need to consider whether avoidance of an Establishment
Clause violation would have justified a First Amendment violation).
* 170 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd,
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
171 Id. at 509.
172 Id. at 510 (stating that teaching children how to "cultivate their relationship
with God through Jesus Christ" is quintessentially religious "[u]inder even the most
restrictive and archaic definitions of religion").
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District,1 73 which upheld a school's denial of access to a church that
desired to use its auditorium for religious services.
174
Finding that the Club's activities were "quintessentially religious"
proved to be the crux of the court's decision. Based on that determi-
nation, the court concluded that it was "eminently reasonable that the
Milford school would not want to communicate to students of other
faiths that they were less welcome than students who adhere to the
Club's teachings."1 75 The court further noted that the constitutionally
problematic risk of the perception that the school was endorsing the
Club was magnified "in view of the fact that those who attend the
school are young and impressionable.' 76 Similarly, the court used its
"quintessentially religious" finding as the basis for holding that the
school had excluded the Club for its subject matter in accordance
with its community use policy rather than because of its viewpoint on
permissible subject matter.177 Specifically, the court concluded that
the Club's activities were essentially religious worship rather than
moral instruction from a religious viewpoint.'7 8 The divided panel
attempted to justify its conclusion in the face of the contradictory
holding in Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of City of La-
due179 by implicitly suggesting that the Eighth Circuit erroneously
overlooked the nature of the Good News/Good Sports Club's
activities.18
0
In his well-written dissent, Judge Jacobs defended the validity and
applicability of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Good News/Good Sports
Club.'"" Though Judge Jacobs began by agreeing with the majority on
the finding of a limited public forum and the two-part test for view-
173 164 F.3d 829 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
174 See Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 510 ("It is difficult to see how the Club's activi-
ties differ materially from the 'religious worship' described in Full Gospel Tabernacle.").
175 Id. at 509.
176 Id.
177 See id. at 509-10 (concluding that the "Good News Club is doing something
other than simply teaching moral values").
178 See id.
179 28 F.3d 1501, 1507 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the school district's amended-
use policy "result[ed] in viewpoint discrimination because it denie[d] the Club access
based on the Club's religious perspective on otherwise includible subject matter").
180 See Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 511 ("The Eighth Circuit apparently took for
granted that the Good News/Good Sports Club's activities amounted only to speaking
on moral and character development. The opinion contains only a brief recitation of
the types of activities that take place at a club meeting, but no examination of their
import.").
181 See id. at 511, 513 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that though "the area of my
agreement with the majority is substantial," "[a] s I read the Eighth Circuit opinion ...
the court carefully sifted the facts-facts substantially identical to those in the present
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point discrimination, he reached the opposite conclusion. 182 Judge
Jacobs relied heavily on the Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's
Chapel'8 3 as justification for his alternative conclusion that Milford,
like the school district in Good News/Good Sports Club, had discrimi-
nated against the Christian Club based on its viewpoint' is4 Accord-
ingly, Judge Jacobs clearly stated that the majority's reliance on the
Club's emphasis of the value and necessity of a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ as legitimizing the Club's exclusion was erroneous
because "Christ is also the central and animating spirit in the view-
point expressed in the Lamb's Chapel films."'18 5 As a matter of fact,
Judge Jacobs pointed out that the already elusive distinction between
permissible subject matter and impermissible viewpoint discrimina-
tion is more evasive when morality is at issue.' 8 6 Though Judge Jacobs
refrained from line-drawing at this point, he apparently felt com-
pelled to conclude that the Club's primary focus was teaching morals,
not "worship," and that even if such a determination was impossible,
courts should err on the side of free speech.' 87 This conclusion is
intriguing for several reasons. First, this distinction suggests that if the
Club's focus was religious worship Judge Jacobs would have held that
Milford could exclude the Club under its community-use policy even
though it tangentially provided teaching of morals and values. ' 88 Sec-
ond, though Judge Jacobs began by presuming that such a distinction
was possible, he qualified it by suggesting that it may not be. The fact
that Judge Jacobs attempted to quantify the Club's emphasis between
worship and teaching morals is surprising because he had refrained
from making similarly difficult distinctions earlier in his dissent.
8 9
case-in concluding that the rejection of the Missouri club was based on viewpoint,
not content").
182 Id. at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
183 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
184 See Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 513-14 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("I cannot
square the majority's analysis in this case with Lambs Chapel .... this case seems to be
much closer to Lamb's Chapel than to Full Gospel Tabernacle.").
185 Id. at 514 (Jacobs, J.,.dissenting) ("I see no basis for saying that the message of
the Good News Club has religious content and that the message of the movie is no
more than a religious viewpoint on a secular subject.").
186 See id. at 514-15 (Jacobs,J., dissenting) ("No one should be surprised if a relig-
ious viewpoint on morality looks very like religion itself.").
187 See id. at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
188 See id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("Because the Club's focus appears to be on
teaching lessons for the living of a morally fit life, and not on worship, I believe that
the Club's message is in fact the 'teach[ing of] morals from a religious perspective.'"
(quoting id. at 508 (majority opinion))).
189 See id. at 514 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that the distinction between the
Club's activities and Lamb's Chapel's activities "lacks traction").
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Furthermore, immediately before making the worship/teaching dis-
tinction, Judge Jacobs quoted from Widmar v. Vincent, in which the
Supreme Court refused to make that same distinction because it
lacked "intelligible content."' 90 In Good News Club, the Court wrestled
with this same distinction; therefore, Judge Jacob's opinion serves as a
useful introduction to the way the Justices ruled.191
The Supreme Court's opinion in Good News Club ultimately vindi-
cated Judge Jacobs because the majority essentially agreed with his
dissent in the Second Circuit case. 192 The majority avoided endorsing
whatJudge Jacobs had labeled a "fallacy" by refusing to engage in dif-
ficult, "quixotic" line-drawing to distinguish religious instruction from
a religious viewpoint on morality. 193 Furthermore, Justice Thomas
supported Judge Jacobs by questioning the Court of Appeals major-
ity's "remarkable" failure even to mention the Lamb's Chapel decision
upon which the Supreme Court relied heavily in its reversal of the
Second Circuit. 194 Justice Thomas's opinion is discussed in greater
detail in the following section.
190 Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6
(1981)); see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.9 ("We think that the distinction [between
religious 'speech' and religious 'worship'] advanced by the dissent lacks a foundation
in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially unmanageable.").
191 See text accompanying infra notes 245-58 (discussing Justice Souter's argu-
ment that the majority's characterization of the Club's activities "ignores reality" be-
cause if taken literally, then "any public school opened for civic meetings must be
opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque" (quoting Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 139 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
192 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 ("Applying Lamb's Chapel, we find it quite
clear that Milford engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it excluded the Club
from the afterschool forum.").
193 See id. at 111-12. In his dissent, Judge Jacobs called the panel's line-drawing a
"fallacy" because it "treats morality as a subject that is secular by nature, which of
course it may be or not, depending on one's point of view." See Good News Club, 202
F.3d at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
194 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 n.3 (quoting Judge Jacobs as evidence of the
ample reminders the Second Circuit had to consider Lamb's Chapel: "I cannot square
the majority's analysis in this case with Lamb's Chapel" (quoting Good News Club, 202
F.3d at 513 (Jacobs, J., dissenting))). Additionally, during oral argument before the
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit majority's "remarkable" oversight was identified
when one of the Justices illuminated the fact thatJudge Miner wrote the opinion in
both Lamb's Chapel-which the Supreme Court reversed-and Good News Club. Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
(No. 99-2036), at 2001 WL 196997, at *4.
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B. Majority Holding and Rationale
The majority began by assuming that Milford Central School op-
erated a limited public forum. 195 Despite granting the state the con-
stitutional power to restrict speech on its grounds, Justice Thomas
quickly proceeded to state why the Court's decisions in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger required finding Milford guilty of unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination. 96 Because the Court considered these
analogous precedents dispositive, it summarily reversed the Second
Circuit's decision. 197 The Court used the same two-part test that the
district and appellate courts used to conclude no impermissible view-
point discrimination existed, which required that the restriction be
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and also
viewpoint neutral.
198
In support of their determination that the substance of the Club's
activities was "materially indistinguishable" from the activities in
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the majority emphasized that in both
cases "religion is the viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed."' 199
The school district was permitted to chose the categories of content
permissible on its grounds; however, the school district could not dis-
criminate against viewpoints on the subjects to which the school had
opened its grounds.20 0 Consequently, though the divided Second Cir-
cuit panel found that the Club's activities were "quintessentially relig-
ious," the Supreme Court said this did not preclude the Club from
teaching morals from a constitutionally protected viewpoint in accor-
dance with Milford's community-use policy.201 In other words, the
majority held that, regardless of the magnitude of the religious pres-
ence of the Club, their right to use the school facilities was still consti-
tutionally guaranteed as long as they were teaching morals and
character development. This conclusion is consistent with the major-
195 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. Both parties stipulated that Milford, pursuant
to N.Y. Educ. Law § 414, created a limited public forum rather than an open public
forum. Id. This distinction is important because the Court stated that a limited pub-
lic forum permits the state to restrict access to its facilities, though that power is not
without limitations. Id.
196 See id. ("Concluding that Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club based on
its religious nature is indistinguishable from the exclusions in these cases, we hold
that the exclusion constitutes viewpoint discrimination.").
197 See id. at 119.
198 See id. at 107 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985)).
199 Id. at 112 n.4.
200 Id. at 111-12.
201 See id. at 111.
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ity's implied policy determination-and Judge Jacobs's dissent in the
Second Circuit-that the judiciary should refrain from actively weigh-
ing the amount of the purely "religious" qualities of groups' activi-
ties.202 Accordingly, the majority found that Rosenberger and Lamb's
Chapel were controlling because in those cases, too, the Court found a
"religious viewpoint."203
On the contrary, Justice Stevens's dissent espoused a radically dif-
ferent legal rule regarding the religious nature of the Club's activi-
ties.20 4 Justice Stevens advocated a method of analyzing viewpoint
discrimination cases that conceptualized a much more active, discre-
tionary role of the court.20 5 Rather than considering the presence of
moral and character development as sufficient to justify finding the
Club entitled to constitutional protection, Justice Stevens delineated
three categories of speech for religious purposes: (1) discussion of a
topic from a religious viewpoint, (2) religious worship, and (3)
proselytizing. 20 6 Based on this categorization, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that Milford was justified in excluding the Club because he
categorized its activities within either the second or third catego-
ries. 20 7 Therefore, while the majority resisted difficult, ambiguous
line-drawing as to how "religious" the Club's activities were, Justice
Stevens advocated even greater judicial quantification of religious
activities.20
8
Justice Thomas also voiced his concern with the "unstated princi-
ple" of the Second Circuit's reasoning that "reliance on Christian
principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other
foundations for thought or viewpoints do not."209 The Court emphat-
202 Id. ("We disagree that something that is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decid-
edly religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of
morals and character from a particular viewpoint.").
203 Id. at 110.
204 See id. at 130-34 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
205 See id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (regarding the ability to distinguish be-
tween different types of religious speech).
206 See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 See id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The line between the various categories of
religious speech may be difficult to draw, but I think that the distinctions are valid,
and that a school, particularly an elementary school, must be permitted to draw
them.").
209 See id. at 111. The accuracy ofJustice Thomas's perceptive critique is revealed
by the Second Circuit panel's admission that the Club's "teachings may involve secu-
lar values such as obedience or resisting jealousy." Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 509 (2d Cir. 2000). The panel, however, immediately qualified its
grudging admission by identifying "an additional layer" to the teachings that the
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ically rejected such a conclusion.2a° Justice Scalia wrote a separate
concurring opinion, in part, to emphasize this point further by com-
paring treatment of the Boy Scouts to treatment of the Good News
Club. 21' As evidence of Milford's unconstitutional bias against the.
Club, Justice Scalia stated that "[f] rom no other group does respon-
dent require the sterility of speech that it demands of petitioners.
'" 212
To illustrate how the school district engaged in anti-religious
viewpoint discrimination, Justice Scalia pointed to groups such as the
Boy Scouts, who would undoubtedly be permitted to provide reasons
for living morally upright lives, such as making the scouts more honor-
able, successful people or making their parents proud. 215 The Club,
however, is prohibited from providing its reasons-in particular, "be-
cause God wants and expects it . . . and because it emulates Jesus
Christ."214 By preventing the Club from supporting its premise that
God exists and dependence on Him is necessary for moral living, the
school hobbles the effectiveness of the Club's undisputedly protected
teachings on moral and character development: 21 5 "[j]ust as calls to
character based on patriotism will go unanswered if the listeners do
not believe their country is good and just, calls to moral behavior
based on God's will are useless if the listeners do not believe that God
exists." 216 Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, not only are the al-
legedly "purely religious" aspects of the Club's activities inseparable
from the Club's teachings on moral and character development, but
the attempt to make such a distinction is itself a form of viewpoint
discrimination.
The Court also rejected Milford's Establishment Clause argument
as an affirmative defense, stating that "the school has no valid Estab-
panel determined, as a matter of law, justified Milford's exclusion of the Club-the
Club's emphasis that "these morals or values are senseless without Christ." Id.
210 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)).
211 See id. at 120-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also wrote separately to
provide additional explanation as to why the Establishment Clause would not be vio-
lated by permitting the Club to use the school facilities after hours. See id. at 121
(Scalia, J., concurring).
212 Id. at 124 (Scalia, J., concurring).
213 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
214 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
215 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). From a purely logical perspective, preventing any
speaker making normative statements from explaining the "why" supporting his ex-
hortations at the very least insures a very ineffective message and uncritical adherents,
if any.
216 Id. at 125 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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lishment Clause interest."217 The Court conceded that avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation could be a compelling state interest
justifying content-based restriction. 218 The majority avoided giving
support to the "clauses-in-conflict" theory with the qualification that
"it is not clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause. violation would justify viewpoint discrimination. '"2 19 The value
this statement has in clarifying the conflict between the clauses and
uncertainty in First Amendment law is limited, but should not be over-
looked.220 Although the Court did leave the possibility of an Estab-
lishment Clause affirmative defense to a general Free Speech Clause
claim open, it restricted the availability of such a defense by denying
the presence of an Establishment Clause violation on the facts in Good
News Club and implicitly questioning whether seeking to avoid govern-
ment endorsement could ever justify viewpoint discrimination.
221
The Court applied the neutrality test to determine whether an
Establishment Clause violation existed.222 The principle of govern-
ment neutrality toward religion is actually one part of the three-part
Lemon test: (1) the statute must have a secular purpose; (2) the stat-
ute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.2 23 It is worth noting that the
majority's silence on the other two prongs of the Lemon test is consis-
tent with its recent jurisprudence involving the Establishment Clause
and with the Court's movement away from strict adherence to
Lemon.224 Nonetheless,Justice Breyer's concurring opinion contains a
217 Seeid. at 113.
218 See id. at 112 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
219 See id. at 113.
220 In his dissent, Justice Souter-not without a hint of apathetic sarcasm-de-
scribes the lack of resolution on the conflict-between-the-clauses issue as emblematic
of the majority decision as a whole: "the consolation may be that nothing really gets
resolved when the judicial process is so truncated, [though] that is not much to rec-
ommend today's result." Id. at 145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
221 See id. at 113 ("We need not, however, confront the issue in this case, because
we conclude that the school has no valid. Establishment Clause interest.").
222 See id. at 114 ("'[A] significant factor in upholding governmental programs in
the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion."' (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995))).
223 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see a/soJonathan Mills, Strict
Separationism's Sacred Canopy, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 397, 406-21 (1994) (discussing the logi-
cal consistency of the Lemon test with strict separationism, as well as the test's key
precedents and their presumptions about religion).
224 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (applying the neutral-
ity test by asking "whether the government acted with the purpyose of advancing or
inhibiting religion" and "whether the aid has the effect of advancing or inhibiting re-
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reminder that Lemon has not been overruled, 225 and, despite the best
efforts of some of the Justices, the Lemon test is not yet dead. 226 Jus-
tice Breyer stated that the "government's 'neutrality' in respect to re-
ligion is one, but only one, of the considerations relevant to deciding
whether a public school's policy violates the Establishment Clause."
227
Applying the neutrality principle to the facts in Good News Club,
Justice Thomas stated that "[b]ecause allowing the Club to speak on
school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, Milford faces
an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to
exclude the Good News Club. ' 228 This statement can be interpreted
two ways. First, Justice Thomas appeared to suggest that Establish-
ment Clause violations will be interpreted more narrowly under the
neutrality test than they were under the Lemon test. For example, neu-
trality, by definition, means not only that religious groups can receive
aid from the government as long as they are not preferred over non-
religious groups, 229 but that they are guaranteed the same aid as non-
religious groups.230  Second, this statement can also be read as
implying that an Establishment Clause violation could conceivably
"trump" a Free Speech Clause violation. The ambiguity of this lan-
guage keeps the possibility of an Establishment Clause violation open
ligion" (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)). Although Justice Kennedy,
in his own concurring opinion also revealed feeling unsettled by the Court's citation
of Lemon, Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397
(1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring), Justice Scalia's discomfort was more elaborate:
"Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, L.emon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again." Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring, with
Thomas, J., joining).
225 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Court in
Lamb's Chapel expressed a similar sentiment in response to Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion: "Lemon, however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled."
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 n.7.
226 Justice Scalia documents this concerted effort to bury Lemon by stating that
"[o]ver the years ... no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their
own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart." Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Scalia then goes on to list the citations
of the supporting cases. Id. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
228 See id. at 114.
229 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 372 (1999) (stating that the "core meaning" of the
Establishment Clause "is no special benefit for religion-'establishing' something
must necessarily mean treating it better than its rivals").
230 See id. at 369-70 ("And if giving special benefits to religion is favoritism, ad-
vancement, and endorsement, then discriminating against religion is hostility, inhibi-
tion, and disapproval.").
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despite having just found viewpoint discrimination. Once again, this
is problematic because it interprets the First Amendment expression
and religion clauses as antagonistic rather than complementary.
At the very least, the Court's holding and application of the neu-
trality test rather than the Lemon test makes a conflict between the
clauses less likely. The Court's reasoning supports this conclusion. In
particular, the Court will not only prevent the Club from receiving
preferential treatment (though it may receive benefits, such as the use
of school facilities, as long as they are neither favored nor disfavored),
but will prevent the school from treating the Club disparately: "we
cannot say the danger that children would misperceive the endorse-
ment of religion is any greater than the danger that they would per-
ceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if they were excluded
from the public forum." 23' This is a favorable improvement from the
Lemon test for religious groups because under Lemon they could not
receive a benefit from the government; now, they simply may not re-
ceive favorable treatment.
Once again, the Court justified its conclusion by relying heavily
on Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Rosenberger.232 Of particular interest is
the majority's dismissal of any "misperception" of government en-
dorsement of the Club's views because the Club's meetings were held
after school, were open to all students with the required parental con-
sent, and the school facilities were open to other groups teaching
moral development.23 3 More importantly, the majority only discussed
these factors in the context of their indication that they actually had
not considered the potential misperceptions of students in their en-
dorsement inquiry. 234 Furthermore, the Court noted that "[a]ny by-
stander could conceivably be aware of the school's use policy and its
exclusion of the Good News Club, and could suffer as much from
viewpoint discrimination as elementary school children could suffer
from perceived endorsement. '" 235 The Court's reasoning suggests a
departure from the "perception inquiry" espoused in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Capitol Square,23 6 but the majority
231 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
232 See id. at 118-19.
233 See id. at 117-18.
234 Id. at 117 ("[E]ven if we were to consider the possible misperceptions by
schoolchildren in deciding whether Milford's permitting the Club's activities would
violate the Establishment Clause, the facts of this case simply do not support Milford's
conclusion.").
235 Id. at 118.
236 See supra notes 89-91.
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did not expressly rely upon a particular test in its consideration of
Milford's allegations of unconstitutional government endorsement.
The Court rejected as "unpersuasive" the presence of elementary
school children as grounds for distinguishing Milford's policy from
the above-mentioned cases 237 and seems- to have based its holding on
the Establishment Clause issue largely on the absence of any material
distinction from previous precedents rather than on a clearly deline-
ated test. 238 The Court spent most of its time dismissing the problems
that Milford alleged were of constitutional magnitude. For example,
the majority determined parents, not children, to be the relevant com-
munity regarding the presence of coercive pressure to attend club
meetings. 23 9 The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the par-
ents were required to give their permission before the children could
attend Club meetings. 240 Additionally, the possibility that other chil-
dren may see the Club on the school premises and misperceive the
relationship between the school and the Christian organization was
considered overly speculative and without supporting precedent.241
The majority's finding of viewpoint discrimination and not en-
dorsement was an important move toward clarifying First Amendment
jurisprudence; however, investigation into the jurisprudential nuances
embedded within the separate opinions is necessary to determine the
magnitude of the adjustment and to predict how the Court will adjudi-
cate similar factual scenarios in the future.
C. Separate Opinions
Although the Second Circuit majority ignored Lamb's Chapel, the
dissenting Justices on the Supreme Court not only addressed it, but
asserted that it could be distinguished on the facts of the case. 242 The
237 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115-16 (conceding that the Court had found
"heightened concerns" about "subtle coercive pressure" in elementary schools in Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992), but distinguishing it on the fact that the
activity at issue was obligatory).
238 See id. at 113 ("We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford's
in two previous free speech cases, Lamb's Chapel and Widmar.").
239 See id. at 115.
240 See id.
241 See id. at 113-14, 119.
242 Justice Souter asserts that even though the Second Circuit panel did not men-
tion Lamb's Chapel, the "Court of Appeals unmistakably distinguished this case from
Lamb's Chapel, though not by name." Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting). Ironically,
despite his suggestion that identifying the most relevant case by name is unnecessary
formalism, Justice Souter then goes on to refer to Lamb's Chapel twenty times in his
dissenting opinion-a mere nine times shy of matching the number of times Justice
Thomas refers to it.
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discrepancy between the majority and the dissent on the presence of
viewpoint discrimination can be summarized as two different readings
of the facts in Good News Club-more specifically, the Justices dis-
agreed about the nature of the Club's activities. Identifying and con-
trasting the way the majority and dissents framed the factual issue is
essential to understanding how they reached opposite conclusions.
This discussion will begin with viewpoint discrimination issue and
then proceed to the endorsement of religion issue.
As Justice Thomas framed the viewpoint discrimination issue
before the Court, the case involved a club that undisputedly sought to
develop the morals and character of attending children by instructing
them to be obedient and kind to others even if others were not kind
in return.2 43 With that as the starting point, Justice Thomas then set
out to determine whether such a club could be excluded from school
grounds simply because it taught the children about quality of charac-
ter from a religious perspective. 244 When this characterization of the
facts is compared to the facts in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the
majority's application of them as dispositive was almost a foregone
conclusion.
On the contrary, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, as-
serted that the majority mischaracterized the Club's essential nature:
an "evangelical service of worship calling children to commit them-
selves in an act of Christian conversion."245 Justice Souter argued that
the majority's characterization of the Club's activities "ignores reality"
because if taken literally, then "any public school opened for civic
meetings must be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or
mosque." 246 This argument raises an important question: at what
point would a majority of the Court agree that substance of a religious
group's activities becomes something other than teaching about
morals and character? For example, an Evangelical Christian church
service on a Sunday morning would certainly provide moral and char-
acter teaching. Presumably, the Court did not mean that Milford
243 See id. at 108 ("Just as there is no question that teaching morals and character
development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford's policy, it is clear
that the Club teaches morals and character development to children.").
244 See id. at 109-10.
245 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). To support his view
of what he asserts is an obvious reality (and consequently not a difficult line-drawing
problem), Justice Souter states that the heart of the meeting is the "challenge" to live
lives worthy ofJesus Christ as Savior and the "invitation" "to trust in the Lord Jesus to
be your Savior from sin" in order to have eternal life. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations omitted).
246 Id. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Central School must grant access to local churches seeking to use its
facilities. If so, the majority left a crucial question unanswered: how
do the courts distinguish content-based discrimination from viewpoint
discrimination?
The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that courts
must draw such a distinction because the Court has treated content-
based discrimination and viewpoint discrimination as different but re-
lated inquiries.247 Nevertheless, the majority in Good News Club "con-
clude[d] that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values." 248 This lan-
guage implies that Milford would only constitutionally be permitted to
exclude the Club under its limited public forum permitting teaching
of moral values if the Club's activities were purely religious worship.
In turn, the only way a school district could prevent churches from
using its facilities is not to permit any private groups to use its facilities
for teaching moral values.
On the other hand, the Court uses other language suggesting
that a greater emphasis on religious worship or proselytizing could
have tipped the scales in favor of finding a permissible content-baSed
restriction rather than viewpoint discrimination. For example, the
Court held that "the substance of the Club's activities ... are materi-
ally indistinguishable from the activities in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenber-
ger-."2 4 9 This language leaves open the possibility that at some point
the Club's emphasis on religion and proselytizing could be materially
distinguishable from the activities in the Court's viewpoint discrimina-
tion precedents. 250 Therefore, the majority's opinion is best charac-
247 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination."). In
Rosenberger, the Court further illustrated this distinction with the following statement:
in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the fo-
rum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we
have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimina-
tion, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited
forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
limitations.
Id. at 829-30.
248 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4.
249 Id.
250 For example, if the district court had found that the Club's activities were "re-
ligious worship," then the Court may have been bound to conclude that Milford had
denied the Club access consistent with its limited public forum-unless the district
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terized as suggesting that the distinction between excludable religious
worship/evangelism and protected moral teaching from a religious
viewpoint may be necessary, but that it was not here because the
Club's activities were protected. The uncertainty within the majority's
opinion on this point, however, is revealed by Justice Souter's dissent-
ing opinion. 251 Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, therefore, helps
demonstrate the need for the Court to explain the distinction be-
tween unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and permissible con-
tent-based restrictions.
Justice Scalia wrote separately in part to address Justice Souter's
characterization of the Club's activities. 252 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia downplayed the distinction between viewpoint discrimi-
nation and content-based discrimination, stating that "I do not sup-
pose it matters whether the exclusion is characterized as viewpoint or
subject-matter discrimination." 253 He also downplayed the distinction
between worship/evangelism and moral teaching from a religious per-
spective. Justice Scalia pointed to the Court's decision in Widmar v.
Vincent to explain why Justice Souter was incorrect in attempting to
distinguish between worship and religious speech. 254 In Widmar, the
Court stated that such a distinction not only has no intelligible con-
tent but also has no relevance to the constitutional issue.255
One possible ground for questioning Justice Scalia's use of
Widmar, however, is that the Court's refusal to distinguish between
worship and religious speech was in the context of a "generally open
forum ' 256 and content-based restrictions. 257 Therefore, as discussed
court abused its discretion. See id. at 112 ("Despite Milford's insistence that the Club's
activities constitute 'religious worship,' the Court of Appeals made no such determi-
nation."); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir.
2000) ("We conclude, as did the district court, that the Good News Club is doing
something other than simply teaching moral values."). Justice Souter rejects the ma-
jority's distinction between "religious worship" and "something other than simply
teaching moral values" as "merely semantic." Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139 n.3
(Souter, J., dissenting).
251 See supra text accompanying notes 242-43.
252 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The dissenters and
the Second Circuit say that the presence of such additional speech, because it is
purely religious, transforms the Club's meetings into something different in kind
from other, nonreligious activities that teach moral and character development." (cit-
ing id. at 130-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 136-39 (Souter, J., dissenting, with
Ginsburg, J., joining))).
253 Id. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring).
254 See id. at 126-27 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 269 n.6 (1981)).
255 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
256 Id. at 269.
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above, the question remains whether such a distinction is possible in
the context of a limited public forum and viewpoint discrimination,
and if so, how that distinction is made. Justice Scalia appeared to have
anticipated this factual difference and attempted to dismiss it by citing
Rosenberger where the Court refused to distinguish between speech,
including an evangelistic message and speech expressing views that a
particular religion might approve.258 Therefore, Justice Scalia seems
to have rejected the distinction entirely between religious worship/
evangelism and moral teaching from a religious perspective. One im-
plication of this position is that school districts' power to regulate
their limited public fora would greatly be curtailed. Judge Jacobs
briefly addressed this implication by suggesting that if the distinction
was impossible, as Justice Scalia seems to have indicated, then courts
should err on the side of protecting more religious speech in the
name of the free speech rather than prohibiting more in the name
protecting a school district's limited public forum.2 59
The bottom line is that the six Justices in the majority, including
Justice Scalia, believed that the facts of Good News Club did not necessi-
tate a direct answer to the question. The three dissenting Justices dis-
agreed, arguing that such a distinction was necessary and the Club's
activities fell within the category of speech that may be restricted.
This six-three split in the Court indicates that though Good News Club
did not provide a bright-line rule distinguishing excludable religious
speech from protected speech on permissible subjects from a religious
viewpoint, the case does provide a fact-sensitive standard that cannot
be far from the exact line. Therefore, this matter is likely to generate
more litigation involving private religious speech. In turn, the parties
involved will seek to elucidate the line between excludable worship or
proselytization, on one hand, and speech on a permissible subject, on
the other.260
257 Id. at 267.
258 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 125-26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844 (1995)). Nonetheless,
this response does not answer the question of whether such a distinction is ever possi-
ble or if it was simply not possible on the facts before the Court in Rosenberger.
259 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("Even if one could not say whether the Club's message con-
veyed religious content or religious viewpoints on otherwise-permissible content, we
should err on the side of free speech. The concerns supporting free speech greatly
outweigh those supporting regulation of the limited public forum.").
260 One example of a very recent legal battle involving a religious group on public
school grounds is the conflict between the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and Rage
Against Destruction (RAD). See Anti-Defamation League, Rage Against Destruction and
Joyce Meyer Ministries, at http://www.adl.org/church-state/rad.asp (Oct. 16, 2002).
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In addition to their conclusions about the viewpoint discrimina-
tion issue, the Justices writing separate opinions also discussed the en-
dorsement defense. The three dissenting Justices agreed that the
Court should not have reached the endorsement of religion issue be-
cause it had not been considered by the district court or circuit
court.261 Justice Souter was especially perturbed by the majority rul-
ing on the issue: "the majority now sees fit to rule on the application
of the Establishment Clause, in derogation of this Court's proper rule
as a court of review."262 The district court refrained from making a
legal determination regarding the Establishment Clause because it
concluded that with no viewpoint discrimination, it was unnecessary
to look to an affirmative defense.263 Consequently, Justice Souter's
The ADL was outraged because RAD was sponsored by Joyce Meyer Ministries, an
evangelical Christian organization, and the secular assemblies about non-violence
were concluded with an invitation to a free concert off-campus: "Don't leave this gym-
nasium without getting a ticket for our free concert tomorrow night .. " All Things
Considered: Controversy Over a Group with Backing by an Evangelical Organization
that Holds Assemblies at Public High Schools (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 3., 2002),
available at 2002 WL 3498943. The concert included the message that "[t]he one
solution to violence in schools is Jesus Christ." Id. Abraham H. Foxman, ADL Na-
tional Director, called the assemblies "one of the stealth tactics used by their or-
ganizers to lure unwitting teens to an unabashed Christian evangelical message."
Deceptive "Anti-Violence" Program Targets Public School Students for Proselytizing,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101757420. RAD spokesman,
Mark Sutherland, said the ADL had scared schools with fallacies and the group was
not violating the separation of church and state. Michele Munz, Two Schools Cancel
Group's Assemblies; Rage Against Destruction Is Accused of Being a Front for Televangelist, ST.
Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2591001. In October 2002,
before a series of assemblies in New York City public schools, the Department of Edu-
cation's general counsel warned RAD "not to proselytize" or advertise for Firefight
during the assemblies or RAD would be banned. Letter from Chad Vignola, General
Counsel, New York City Department of Education, to Director of Rage Against De-
struction (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.adl.org/church-state/nyboe-ltr.jpg
(last visited Mar. 20, 2003). In December 2002, RAD discontinued its programs after
"evaluating the effectiveness of the organization in relation to the monetary cost and
effort needed for it to achieve its purpose and goals." Rage Against Destruction Dis-
continuation Notice, at http://ragead.org/ragead/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
261 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130, 134 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 134,
139-41 (Souter, J., dissenting, with Ginsburg, J., joining).
262 Id. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160 (N.D.N.Y.
1998) ("Because the Court finds that defendant has not violated the plaintiffs' First
Amendment right of free speech, it need not consider whether the defendant's ac-
tions were necessary to comply with the constitutional prohibition against state estab-
lishment of religion."), affjd, 202 F.3d 502 (2000), rev'd, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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review of why appellate courts must resist the temptation of acting as a
court of first instance is not without justification.
264
On the other hand, the existing facts may have presented a clear
enough case to merit resolution of the issue without remanding the
case for additional factfinding. In light of the fact that the Club was
appealing the district court's summary judgment verdict for Milford,
with the Court interpreting the disputed facts most favorably to the
Club, this action is not necessarily unreasonable. 265 Justice Souter's
rejoinder to this rebuttal was that "[w]hat we know about this case
looks very little like Widmaror Lamb's ChapeL."2 6 6 Attempting to differ-
entiate these cases from the facts at issue, Justice Souter argued that
three distinguishing factors were present: the age of the children (as
young as six), the location and intellectual atmosphere at the elemen-
tary school (as opposed to a university campus), and the timing and
format of the Club's meetings (immediately following school in a
classroom) .267
The common assumption underlying each of the factors Justice
Souter demarcated is that the "particular impressionability of school-
children" demands a more sensitive analysis of the Establishment
Clause, a violation of which is correspondingly easier to trigger.
268
Justice Thomas rebutted this by distinguishing the supporting author-
ity cited by Justice Souter, Edwards v. Aguillard, noting that Edwards
addressed the susceptibility of young children to "the content of the
curriculum taught by state teachers during the schoolday."269 Addition-
ally, Justice Thomas poignantly observed that children were only per-
mitted to attend Club meetings with their parents' permission.
270
Thus, the majority stated that "the concerns expressed in Edwards are
not present."2 7 1 Though these facts may distinguish Edwards from
Good News Club, it is not clear that the general principle Milford seeks
to glean from Edwards and other sources is illegitimate.
272
264 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
265 See id. at 105. Justice Breyer makes a similar observation in his concurring
opinion, which generally seeks to limit the majority's holding. See id. at 128-29
(Breyer, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 142 (Souter, J., dissenting).
267 See id. at 142-44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
268 See id. at 142-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987)).
269 Id. at 116-17.
270 Id. at 117.
271 Id.
272 The majority required an express recognition of the impressionability of ele-
mentary school children, which was lacking. See id. at 117 n.7 (dismissing the rele-
vancy of several cases relied upon by Milford to establish a controlling precedent
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Lastly, Justice Souter, citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Capitol Square, questioned whether the majority accurately assessed
whether a child could perceive that the school has endorsed a particu-
lar religion or religion in general. 273 Justice Breyer expressed a simi-
lar concern, though he stated it as a clarification of the majority's
opinion rather than as a challenge to the legitimacy of the majority's
conclusion. 274 Justice Thomas addressed both Justices' concerns by
first indicating that the Court did not inquire into the minds of the
school children to determine whether the Establishment Clause had
been violated. 275 Second, even if he had, Justice Thomas could not
say that "the danger that children would misperceive the endorsement
of religion is any greater than the danger that they would perceive a
hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the Club were excluded
from the public forum." 2 76 Interestingly, Justice Thomas cited the
same portion of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion to explain
why the Court did not consider the misperceptions of the youngest
children as dispositive.277 The dissents' concerns may explain why the
majority addressed the "perception inquiry" by discussing a reasona-
ble student's potential misperception of government endorsement of
the Club-or in this case, the lack thereof-despite having not consid-
ered it as part of their own Establishment Clause inquiry. 278
regarding the impressionability of elementary school children even after school); id.
at 118 n.8 (denying that Congress recognized the impressionability of elementary
school children in the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (2000)); see also Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (holding that
§ 4071(b) prohibited a high school from "discriminating, based on the content of the
students' speech, against students who wish to meet on school premises during nonin-
structional time"). Thus, the controlling precedent sought by Milford was absent, but
the majority dismissed the strength of the general principle by assuming that an ex-
press statement was necessary.
273 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Capitol Square, stating that the endorsement test
does not focus "on the actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have
differing degrees of knowledge," but on "the perspective of a hypothetical observer"
(quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80
(1995))).
274 See id. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring).
275 See id. at 118 ("[E]ven if we were to inquire into the minds of schoolchildren in
this case .
276 Id.
277 See id. at 119 ("We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence us-
ing a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed
on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive." (cit-
ing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 779-80)).
278 Justice Thomas also noted that both parties had thoroughly briefed the Estab-
lishment Clause issue and neither had requested a remand. Id. at 119 n.9.
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Unlike Justice Breyer and the dissenting Justices, Justice Scalia
never addressed whether the Establishment Clause issue was properly
before the Court. Instead, he agreed with the majority's holding on
the issue and wrote to emphasize two points. First, Justice Scalia wrote
to emphasize that coercion was not a concern in the case, but rather
the protected "private right to exert and receive that compulsion (or
to have one's children receive it) [that] is protected by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses." 279 Second, he wrote to reiterate
the test he provided in Capitol Square for identifying impermissible
government endorsement of religion under the Establishment
Clause. 2 1° After applying the test to the limited public forum at hand,
Justice Scalia stated that "private speech that occurs in a limited public
forum, publicly announced, whose boundaries are not drawn to favor
religious groups but instead permit a cross-section of uses" cannot vio-
late the Establishment Clause.281 In other words, Justice Scalia reaf-
firmed his plurality opinion in Capitol Square, where he articulated the
per se test for endorsement.28 2 Under this conceptualization of the
Establishment Clause, if there is viewpoint discrimination, then no
government endorsement of religion is possible.
IV. ANALySiS
What are the implications of the Court's decision in Good News
Club? Did the Court provide any clarification of the "clauses-in-con-
flict" theory? Now that the dust has settled, what does the scope of the
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses look like?
Although the Court took a step towards dispelling the "clauses-in-
conflict" nomenclature, its decision is more analogous to sounding
the retreat of the confusion in its First Amendment jurisprudence
rather than ringing its death knell. One factor evidencing this reality
is the Court's unexplained change from the Lemon test toward a strict-
279 Id. at 121 (Scalia,J., concurring).
280 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Religious expression cannot violate the Establish-
ment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or desig-
nated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." (quoting
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 770)).
281 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 401 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring)).
282 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 767 ("By its terms that Clause
applies only to the words and acts of government. It was never meant, and has never
been read by this Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech
connected to the State only through its occurrence in a public forum.").
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neutrality test for Establishment Clause violations.28 3 Although Lemon
may continue to haunt the Court,284 the growing dominance of the
neutrality test provides private religious groups with more freedom to
receive, and the state has more freedom (and duty) to give, equal ben-
efits. By permitting private religious groups to receive governmental
aid as long as that aid is equally available to nonreligious groups, the
Court brings greater clarity to the line delineating the complementary
application of the Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses.
As a plurality of the Justices have stated, the Establishment Clause
only applies to the government; it is not implicated by private
speech. 285 Justice Scalia, in particular, has consistently provided a
clear test for identifying endorsement; a per se test that coherently
resolves the supposed conflict between the clauses.286 This test, char-.
acterized by a bright-line rule approach to government speech rather
than a totality-of-the-circumstances standard, has yet to be expressly
embraced by a majority of the Court. However, by more carefully in-
quiring into who the speaker is-specifically by refraining from prob-
lematic considerations of the misperceptions of observers-the
Supreme Court has aided the lower courts in their difficult task of
adjudicating viewpoint discrimination cases in a way compatible with
the Establishment Clause. Policymakers rely on these constitutional
abstractions for guidance in making binding decisions affecting stu-
dents, communities, and society as a whole.
Furthermore, from a purely logical perspective, Justice Scalia's
test for government endorsement of religion makes good sense. To
ask whether viewpoint discrimination can be justified by the compel-
ling state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation is to
ask a nonsensical question such as asking whether God can make a
rock so big that He cannot lift it. The question cannot be answered
yes or no. Instead, the question itself is flawed. In the latter question,
this flaw is revealed by pointing out that we must not be talking about
God-who is omnipotent, and by definition must be-because no
such rock exists nor can it exist. Similarly, in the former question, we
must not be talking about viewpoint discrimination because no such
Establishment Clause violation exists nor can it exist. Finding view-
point discrimination presumes a neutral government policy where a
283 See supra notes 222-41 and accompanying text, discussing the majority's deci-
sion regarding the Establishment Clause in Good News Club.
284 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra notes
70, 102-03, 110, 224-26, discussing the Court's view of Lemon as having very limited
authority, if any.
285 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 83-88, 278-80 and accompanying text.
2003 ]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
government actor has impermissibly banned a private group due to its
viewpoint. In both scenarios, the two items, thus pitted against each
other, cannot logically coexist.
This argument is further bolstered by the logical principle of
non-contradiction. 287 The related principle of identity is an instruc-
tive introduction to the principle of non-contradiction. 2 8 This self-
evident principle simply states that "[a] thing is what it is." 289 To say
that private speech is not private speech is illogical. One cannot prove
that private speech cannot both be private and non-private (i.e., gov-
ernment) speech, but one cannot explain how the speech can be both
private and non-private at the same time either. Some Justices and
scholars have tried to prove the latter by arguing that the private
speech is transformed into government speech via the perception of a
"reasonable observer."29°1 That "reasonable" observer, however, is irra-
tional because he has denied the essence of the thing and is guilty of
an illogical "misperception."291 This reality is more lucid in the con-
text of the First Amendment as a whole. The "perception inquiry" for
endorsement as a defense to viewpoint discrimination requires the
judge to view the same speech simultaneously as private under the
Free Speech Clause and government under the Establishment Clause.
To say that private speech under the First Amendment is also non-
private, government speech under First Amendment is to deny that
"the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time. 292
This argument can be further supported by relying on canons of inter-
pretation such as applying the parts of one section of text consistent
with each other.2 93 If the private speech is protected under the Free
287 See CHARLES RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT Is & WHY WE
NEED IT 137-38 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining the principle of non-contradiction).
288 Id. at 137.
289 Id.
290 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
291 Compare the majority's use of the word "misperception" when discussing the
potential perception of government endorsement of religion in Good News Club, Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118-19 (2001), with the plurality's use
of the word "misperception" in Capitol Square when arguing against Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Capitol Square Review & Ad-
visory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768-69 (1995).
292 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 94, art. 2, at 1009 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Brothers 1947) (1485) (citing ARis-
TOTLE, METAPHYSICS iv, text. 9).
293 See sources cited supra note 157 emphasizing the importance of interpreting
clauses within the same amendment as compatible so that the whole is internally co-
herent. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
app. at 20 (2002) (listing canons of statutory interpretation such as "[a]void interpret-
ing a provision in a way that is inconsistent with the structure of the statute" and
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Speech Clause, then it cannot be government speech prohibited
under the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, this statement is best
characterized as normative rather than descriptive in light of the Su-
preme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, the Court in Good News Club made progress by re-
fraining from applying the "perception inquiry" in its endorsement
analysis, but it did not reject such an inquiry and even discussed fac-
tors relevant under the inquiry without actually "considering" it.294
This limits the precedential value of the decision, which also has lim-
ited precedential value for determining the nature of limited public
fora because the Court merely assumed the existence of a limited pub-
lic forum based on the parties mutual stipulations. 295 Fortunately,
Good News Club does, however, provide some additional guidance on
how school officials and other government actors should respond to
the request of private religious groups to use state facilities.
The Court relied heavily on its previous rulings in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger to such an extent that policymakers at public schools
can permit religious groups presenting subject matter included under
their school's community-use policy to use the facilities with confi-
dence that the Establishment Clause will not be implicated.296 The
Court considered its previous rulings dispositive and refused to en-
gage in fallacious line-drawing to distinguish Good News Club from
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger.297 The result is not a broader doctrine
of viewpoint discrimination so much as a clearer statement that relig-
ious groups, even if their message is "quintessentially religious," are
entitled to protection under the Free Speech Clause. Religious
groups emphasizing the importance of a personal relationship with
Jesus Christ-a focus present in all three of the above mentioned
cases-cannot be singled out for disparate treatment. 298 For a private
group to instruct others about the need to repent of their sins, believe
"[a]void interpreting a provision in a way inconsistent with the policy of another
provision").
294 See supra notes 234 & 275 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text, discussing the majority's deci-
sion in Good News Club regarding the absence of viewpoint discrimination.
296 See supra notes 192-93, 232 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 199, 247-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
whether Justice Scalia may be suggesting that such a distinction is impossible, see
supra notes 252-59.
298 Justice Scalia emphatically supported this statement by arguing,
It will be a sad day when this Court casts piety in with pornography, and
finds the First Amendment more hospitable to private expletives than to pri-
vate prayers. This would be merely bizarre were religious speech simply as
protected by the Constitution as other forms of private speech; but it is out-
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in Jesus Christ as God incarnate, and trust in Him alone for salvation
involves a claim to Truth that is inherently religious. However, the
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that when this message is com-
bined with a discussion of permissible subject matter in a limited pub-
lic forum, the government may not ban it.
A majority of the Court has yet to address whether any distinction
between a group primarily focused on worship or evangelism and a
group primarily focused on teaching morals from a religious perspec-
tive is possible. Judge Jacobs described this area of the First Amend-
ment best by stating that "[t]he distinction between content
discrimination and viewpoint discrimination is elusive and subtle" and
is "especially slippery where the viewpoint in question is religious."
299
If the Court's viewpoint discrimination analysis is to be different from
its content-based analysis, such a distinction is necessary and must be
possible. If it is possible, the Court needs to articulate a principled
means for making such a difficult determination. If it is not possi-
ble-and a standard so inherently fraught with the danger of appeal-
ing to the preconceptions of the judge may not be realistically
administrable, especially when religion is involved-then more relig-
ious speech would be protected at the expense of schools' power to
restrict access to their limited public fora. Such a result is a win-win
situation because schools would become greater assets to their com-
munities and more effective facilitators to their students by opening
their doors more widely to private groups on a neutral basis.
A definite pattern emphasizing a strict-neutrality test for the Es-
tablishment Clause is emerging in the Court's religious viewpoint dis-
crimination cases. The requirement of government neutrality toward
religion emphasized in Good News Club appears to reflect a greater
sensitivity regarding hostility to religion. This sensitivity should not be
misperceived as privileging the religious over the secular; on the con-
trary, it is a correction of past misinterpretations of the Establishment
Clause. Good News Club is properly perceived as yet another incremen-
tal correction of the Supreme Court's oversensitivity toward endorse-
right perverse when one considers that private religious expression receives
preferential treatment under the Free Exercise Clause.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767 (1995) (plurality
opinion) (citation omitted). Eugene Volokh has made similar statements about the
status of religious speech: "[r]eligious speech is not some stepchild of constitutional
law: It is fully protected by the Free Speech Clause, and once the government sets up
a generally open subsidy program, it can't discriminate against religious speech in
operating the program." Volokh, supra note 229, at 366.
299 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 514 (2d Cir. 2000) (Ja-
cobs, J., dissenting).
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ment of religion in the past. To avoid further promulgating the
confusion in the First Amendment-surrounding the Establishment
Clause in particular-the Court should expressly embrace a strict-neu-
trality test.30 0 The Court is unlikely to make such a bold move in the
near future; however, the recent series of incremental adjustments ap-
proach neutrality nonetheless. For example,just as the Court rejected
the school district's argument that children would perceive govern-
ment endorsement of religion merely because a Christian club met on
school grounds after hours on an equal basis with other -private
groups teaching moral development, the Court more recently re-
jected a very similar argument in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
3 0
1
In Zelman, the respondents, a group of Ohio taxpayers, sought to
enjoin a Cleveland school voucher program on the ground that provi-
sion of tuition aid to students whose parents chose a private religious
school violated the Establishment Clause.30 2 One of the respondents'
arguments was that the program created a "public perception that the
State is endorsing religious practices and beliefs."30 3 The majority
flatly rejected this argument, stating that the Court had "repeatedly
recognized that no reasonable observer would think a neutral pro-
gram of private choice.., carries with it the imprimatur of government
endorsement. '"3 0 4 Because the Cleveland voucher program permitted
individuals to "exercise genuine choice among public and private, sec-
ular and religious," it was neutral and therefore, constitutionally per-
missible under the Establishment Clause.30 5 The Court emphasized
that the Cleveland program was one of "true private choice,"30 6 reiter-
ating another theme implicit in Good News Club. Specifically, for the
government's stance toward religion to be neutral, it must permit pri-
vate individuals to make and listen to value judgments that incorpo-
300 See Ryan W. Decker, Note, Removing a Brick from the Jyffersonian Wall of Separa-
tionism: A Per Se Rule for Private Religious Speech in Public Fora, 41 ViLL. L. REV. 559, 604
(1996) ("Conflicting interpretations of Establishment Clause issues may persist as
long as members of the Court refuse to abandon the unwieldy Lemon, endorsement
and coercion analyses."); see also id. at 594 n.133, 596 n.136 (citing sources describing
the inherent flaws of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test and Justice Kennedy's co-
ercion test); id. at 595 n.135 (citing sources criticizing the Lemon test).
301 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2468-69 (2002).
302 Id. at 2463-65.
303 Id. at 2468.
304 Id. The divide between the Justices was nearly the same in Zelman as in Good
News Club, except that in ZelmanJustice Breyerjoined the dissent rather than concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. See id. at 2502-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Good
News Club, 533 U.S. at 127-30 (Breyer, J., concurring).
305 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473.
306 Id.
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rate a religious viewpoint. 30 7 For the government to tell an individual
that it is permissible to speak on moral and character development or
to choose how to educate the individual's child and yet remove all of
the religious options is to deprive that individual of a meaningful
choice. 30 8 Similarly, Good News Club reflects a proper view of the Es-
tablishment Clause, namely, one that is characterized by neutrality to-
ward religion.309  This is particularly true in light of persuasive
arguments that modern public education is inherently hostile to
religion.310
307 See Richard W. Garnett, A Supreme Court Ruling Bodes Well for School Vouchers,
WALL ST. J.,June 13, 2001, at A20 (predicting that the Court's decision in Good News
Club "makes it clear that the First Amendment permits religious schools and faith-
based service providers to participate in our shared efforts for educational
opportunity").
308 See id. ("Our Constitution protects religious freedom both by telling govern-
ments that they may not establish religion and by promising citizens that they need
not check their religious beliefs at the entrance of the public square."); see also
Volokh, supra note 229, at 365 ("The government may choose to fund only govern-
ment-run schools and not private ones, because such a distinction would be based on
government control, not religiosity; but any choice programs that help secular private
schools may not exclude religious ones."). But see Leslie C. Griffin, Their Own Prepos-
sessions: The Establishment Clause, 1999-2000, 33 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 237, 244 (2001) (as-
serting that "the core Establishment Clause principle [is] no-aid-to-religious-practice"
and that "[a]id includes any use of public facilities").
309 See Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions, supra note 157, at 316
("[N]eutrality is a means to minimizing the government's influence over personal
choices concerning religious beliefs and practices.").
310 See, e.g., Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 108 (1987) (arguing that the
state "cannot present teenagers with a neutral account of the choice among absti-
nence, contraception, and abortion" because "[a]gnosticism about the significance of
sex is no more neutral than agnosticism about the existence of God"); PAUL. MAR-
SHALL, GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION 132 (2002) ("Neither ignoring God, nor simply
listing a religion as a possible option of individual choice, ultimately treats religion,
and religious differences, in their integrity. It implicitly demeans or rejects them.");
CHARLES E. RICE, THE WINNING SIDE: QUESTIONS ON LIVING THE CULTURE OF LIFE 65,
163-66 (1999) (arguing that "the Court's requirement of suspension ofjudgment on
the existence of God has resulted in the repudiation of the American Founding
through the effective establishment of agnostic secularism as the national religion"
and that "state schools indoctrinate their students in a religion of secularism"); An-
drew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education Toward Religion: Why
Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HlAw. L. REV. 697,
728 (1997) (arguing that though the "privileging of secular perspectives and ideolo-
gies over religious beliefs" in public schools does not rise to the level of constitution-
ally impermissible hostility to religion, it does "create a climate that is alienating to
conservative religious believers").
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CONCLUSION
Though separationists may proclaim degradation of the Establish-
ment Clause, as Professor Esbeck says, that is simply "nonsensical."311
If the speaker is private, and if the state treats the religious speaker
neutrally, then the Establishment Clause is not implicated. The per se
test for endorsement that Justice Scalia has consistently applied meets
this formulation of the Establishment Clause and would bring much
needed clarity to the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The
greater sensitivity to government hostility toward religion displayed in
Good News Club, and the Court's recent First Amendment jurispru-
dence in general, is not favoring religious beliefs, but rather a much
needed move toward treating religious perspectives equally. After all,
"[t] he Constitution bars the 'establishment of religion,' and treating
everyone the same without regard to religion is hard to see as 'estab-
lishing' anything-except equality."312 The Supreme Court's empha-
sis in Good News Club on neutrality over past misinterpretations of the
Establishment Clause can and should be strengthened. Nevertheless,
the Court took a promising step toward a clear, workable test for en-
dorsement and a reconciliation of the clauses of the First Amend-
ment. In the process, the Court reached the correct holding: a
finding of viewpoint discrimination and not endorsement of religion.
311 See Esbeck, supra note 124, at 887.
312 See Volokh, supra note 229, at 345.
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